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U.S. Intentions on Deep Seabed Mining: Challenges for International Law and Global Governance

October 5, 2025


The United States has signalled its intention to advance deep seabed mining not only within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but also in the international seabed area (“the Area”). This is significant because the Area, as defined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is designated as the common heritage of humankind and subject to management by the International Seabed Authority (ISA).[1] Any unilateral move by a non-party such as the United States to authorize mining in the Area risks undermining the international legal framework developed over the past four decades.


The U.S. position

 The United States remains outside UNCLOS, despite signing the 1994 Implementation Agreement.[2] Since 1982, its oceans policy has been based on recognizing and applying provisions of UNCLOS that reflect customary international law, while rejecting those that do not.[3] In practice, this allows Washington to “cherry-pick” obligations — for instance, upholding navigation rights — while avoiding binding commitments under Part XI, which establishes the regime for mineral resources in the Area. It should also be noted that the U.S. participates in the ISA as an observer.

In recent statements, the U.S. has repeatedly rejected the principle that Part XI and the concept of the common heritage of humankind (UNCLOS Article 137) are binding upon it.[4] However, many scholars argue that this principle has attained customary status.[5] If so, the United States’ rejection would not exempt it from the obligation to comply. A unilateral U.S. mining regime would therefore generate legal uncertainty and could encourage other states to disregard their UNCLOS obligations, further eroding the authority of the ISA.

ISA and international response

 The ISA has succeeded in developing a regulatory framework for prospecting and exploration but has yet to finalize exploitation regulations, despite the “two-year rule” being invoked.[6] This regulatory gap creates space for unilateral initiatives, yet it does not diminish the ISA’s authority. For more than 30 years, states have accepted that activities in the Area can only be undertaken under the UNCLOS framework.[7]

Any attempt by the United States to bypass this framework directly challenges the ISA’s legitimacy and undermines the principle of equitable access that is central to many developing states.

Environmental and scientific considerations

 The scientific consensus remains that knowledge of deep-sea ecosystems is insufficient to assess the long-term consequences of mining. Accordingly, 38 states and numerous experts have advocated applying the precautionary principle.[8] Unilateral U.S. action would contravene this approach and could cause irreversible damage to biodiversity in the Area, undermining other international commitments, including those under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Geopolitical drivers

 The U.S. position cannot be separated from global competition over critical minerals. China currently produces around 90% of the world’s rare earth elements,[9] a dominance that provides strategic leverage and heightens U.S. vulnerability. Western governments have responded by seeking to diversify supply chains, promote domestic extraction, and explore alternative sources — including the seabed.[10]

For the United States, unilateral deep seabed mining in its EEZ or the Area may therefore be viewed as strategically necessary, despite the accompanying legal and environmental concerns.

Future scenarios

 Three broad outcomes are foreseeable:

1. Unilateral Exploitation: The U.S. proceeds under domestic law, setting a precedent for others and weakening the UNCLOS regime.

2. International Pushback:Coordinated diplomatic and economic pressure renders unilateral mining politically or commercially untenable.

3. Institutional Reform:The crisis accelerates efforts within the ISA to adopt exploitation regulations, potentially restoring credibility and reinforcing multilateral governance. This could help establish a solid legal framework for responsible deep seabed mining — if that is possible.

In addition to these scenarios, civil society and NGOs should not be overlooked. They are likely to generate significant pressure against unilateral mining through advocacy, litigation, and lobbying, which could shape the future direction of deep seabed governance.

Conclusion

 The U.S. challenge to the UNCLOS regime raises fundamental questions of legality, environmental sustainability, and equity in the governance of the global commons. At its core lies a tension between strategic resource security and adherence to international law. Whether the principle of the common heritage of humankind endures will depend on the ability of the international community — particularly UNCLOS parties — to respond in a unified and credible manner. Without such unity, unilateralism risks eroding not only the seabed regime but also broader confidence in rules-based governance of the oceans.


[1] UNCLOS, Art. 136–137.
[2] Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1994. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/treaty_103-39.pdf.
[3] Ronald Reagan, “Statement on United States Oceans Policy” (1982), Reagan Presidential Library, available at: https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-united-states-oceans-policy.
[4] U.S statement: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.isa.org.jm/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/USA-statement-for-ISA-Assembly-July-2025.pdf.
[5] The Latest Trump Threat to International Law: Unilaterally Mining the Area by Coalter Lathrop, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-latest-trump-threat-to-international-law-unilaterally-mining-the-area/.
[6] UNCLOS, Annex III, Art. 4; Art. 139.
[7] International Seabed Authority, “FAQs for Media” (2024), available at: https://www.isa.org.jm/faq-for-media/.
[8] Deep-sea mining moratorium, https://deep-sea-conservation.org/solutions/no-deep-sea-mining/.
[9] Reuters, “China’s rare earth exports grind to halt as trade war controls bite” (11 April 2025) https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-rare-earth-exports-grind-halt-trade-war-controls-bite-2025-04-11/.
[10] European Commission, Critical Raw Materials Act Q&A (2025) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_25_865 ; U.S. Department of Energy, “Critical Materials and Minerals” (2023) https://www.energy.gov/cmm/what-are-critical-materials-and-critical-minerals#:~:text=Critical%20minerals:%20The%20Secretary%20of,reactors%20is%20a%20fuel%20material.